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Abstract 
 
 
This study identifies a negative impact of mining on access to the public water system in Peru 
using district data from 2011 and a similar methodology as Loayza, Mier y Teran and Rigolini 
(2013). One potential explanation for this result can be found by assessing the effects of mining 
on the investment prioritization of local governments; responsible for providing basic services in 
Peru. A quantitative assessment of public investment data on a district level indicates that mining 
districts tend to have a lower propensity to invest in water and sanitation and a higher propensity 
to invest in infrastructure; a pattern which corresponds to the incentive scheme of the mining 
industry. By studying the potential indirect and direct channels of influence that the industry has 
over local governments, the study concludes that the presence of mining is affecting local 
governments to invest in areas which benefit the mining industry on the expense of adequate 
service delivery for its citizens.  
 
Key words: Mining, local governments, access to water, social conflicts, environmental impact of 
mining, water supply, Peru, political economy, canon minero, public investment, development 
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1. Introduction 
The growth of mineral export has been recognized as the motor behind the last decades’ economic 
success in Peru (The Economist, 2012). Research on the impact of mining on local development 
in the country has identified a number of positive impacts on socioeconomic conditions on a local 
level (Macroconsult, 2012). Despite these positive effects, the mining development has been 
accompanied by social unrest and protests (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2012). Many of these conflicts 
concern the environmental concerns of mining. Among them, the access to and the quality of water 
supply are of key importance (The World Bank, 2005). Do the population have reasons for their 
concerns? To answer this question, I looked at the average percentage of households with access 
to the public water system on a districts level using public data from 2011 and compared mining 
and non-mining districts1 and found that the population of districts hosting mining production had, 
on average, close to 5 % lower access to water. When looking at water access in 1993, before the 
mining boom, there seem to be no difference between the two groups. In this study, I quantitatively 
assess the impact of mining in Peru on a district level using a methodology found in Loayza, Mier 
y Teran and Rigolini (2013) and my findings provides support for my initial observations. When 
controlling for district specific characteristics, mining seems to have a negative impact on the 
access to water in Peru. What could explain this effect? 
The mining industry demands large amounts of water in production and, unfortunately for 
Peru; water, although abundant, is unequally distributed and tends to be scarce in the areas where 
mining in located (Olson in Giugale, et al, 2007:409). In fact, the scarcity of water has become one 
of the main concerns for the future expansion of the mining industry (Wiertz, 2008). There are, in 
consequence, clear incentives for the mining industry to gain control over local water resources. 
                                                             
1 I define mining districts as district which hosted a large scale mine during the years 2006-2010 (MEM) 
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But the mining industry is not responsible for providing water for the population; the local 
governments, however, are. The following question arises; is the presence of mining affecting the 
investment prioritizations of local governments? Besides water, I identified infrastructure as 
investment areas where the mining industry has strong interests. The need to expand and improve 
the road system has been pinpointed as one of the main concerns for further development of the 
mining industry in Peru (KPMG, 2013). I therefore focus on public investments in water and 
sanitation (the expansion and maintenance of public water system) and infrastructure (expansion 
and maintenance of roads) respectively when assessing the impact of mining on local 
governments’ investment prioritization.  
This study proposes that, to understand the negative effect mining seems to have on access 
to water on a district level, the role of the local governments must be taken into account. Previous 
attempts at assessing the impact of mining has mostly ignored the role of the public sector. The 
main contribution of this paper is therefore twofold. By analyzing the potential channels through 
which the mining industry could influence the investment behavior of local governments, I identify 
direct and indirect effects of mining which could potentially affect the local governments’ 
priorities. Secondly, as part of the quantitative assessment, I use local government investment data 
to assess the impact of mining on the propensity of local governments to invest in water and 
sanitation and infrastructure respectively. In line with expectations, I find that mining tends to have 
a negative effect on the propensity to invest in water and sanitation during the years preceding 
2011. In addition, the influence of mining on the propensity to invest in infrastructure is positive, 
suggesting a shift, due to the presence of mining, in local governments’ prioritization towards areas 
which could potentially benefit the mining industry. These results could provide an explanation to 
why districts hosting mining tend to have a lower access to water.  
The framework of the study is presented in chapter 2; the methodology of the empirical 
analysis is presented in chapter 3; finally, the results and conclusions are presented in chapter 4 
and 5.  
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2. Mining in Peru 
 
The following part of the study will provide the reader with necessary information about the 
development of mining in Peru. I begin with an overview over the growth of mining, its relation 
to water access and the importance of the local governments. Subsequently, I go into more detail 
about the demand for water in mining production, the current water situation in Peru and the 
tension that mining has created in the local communities. I provide a literature overview of the 
impact of mining and finally analyze the political economy of mining on a local level in Peru. The 
main purpose is to understand the incentive scheme of the mining industry and to explore the 
channels through which the mining industry could impact water coverage on a local level in Peru 
focusing on the role of the local governments’ investment prioritization. 
 
2.1. Mining, Local Governments and Water – Scope of study 
 
Peru has during the two last decades experiences a mining boom which has increased the 
importance of the mining industry in the overall Peruvian economy. The mining and refinery 
industry has gone from representing under 5 % of the total GDP in 1994 to making up 14.4 % of 
total GDP in 2007 and more than 28.1  % of GDP when excluding Lima (Macroconsult, 2012:7). 
The mining industry has continued to grow and by 2012, the export of minerals made up over 56 
% of total exports (MEM, 2013). Peru is today a top world producer of silver, copper, zinc tin, 
lead and gold (Pwc, 2012). The growth of export of mining products is illustrated in the diagram 
below and the importance of mining is illustrated in the circle diagram with the composition of 
export sector in Peru 
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Diagram 1 and 2  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MEM (2013) 
 
 
 
The growth of the mineral export in Peru has been pinpointed as the motor behind the economic 
boom in Peru during the last decade (The Economist, 2012). There are two main forces behind the 
mining development in Peru. The liberalization policies, backed by the World Bank, implemented 
during the nineties which resulted in the privatization of the mining sector and opened up the 
market for foreign investments (De Echeve, 2009:291-292). The second force is the favorable 
development of mineral prices during the last two decades which has made it profitable to exploit 
mining areas which were previously unfeasible and which has created profits on the market 
facilitating expansion of the industry (Macroconsult, 2012). The development of mineral prices is 
illustrated in diagram 3.  
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Diagram 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MEM (2009), MEM(2010) 
 
The Peruvian government and the World Bank believed in the potential of the mining industry as 
a positive force towards development in the country. Quantitative studies assessing the impact of 
mining on a local level in Peru have indeed identified a number of positive effects; for example an 
increase in household consumption, a decreased level of poverty on an increased literacy rate 
(Loayza, et al, 2013; Macroconsult, 2012). Despite these positive results, the mining boom has 
been accompanied by an increase in social conflicts related to the expansion of mining in the 
country (La Defensoria del Pueblo, 2012). Many of these conflicts are related to environmental 
concerns due to the effects of mining expressed by the local population. Access to and the quality 
of water supply are the main focus of these concerns (The World Bank, 2005). 
By comparing the percentage of households with access to the public water system on a 
district level in Peru between mining districts and non-mining districts in 2011, I found support 
for the concerns of the local communities. Districts which hosted producing mines between the 
years 2006-2010 have on average 5 % lower access to water than the non-mining districts. This is 
a peculiar result worth exploring since mining districts have lower levels of poverty; which has a 
significantly negative effect on water access (as shown in my results as well as others), and the 
local government of mining districts have substantially larger budgets and hence more fiscally apt 
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to meet the demands of their citizens. In addition, it seems as though, the difference did not exist 
before the mining boom, in 1993. The simple comparison is displayed in table 1.   
 
Table 1. Average poverty, budget size, access to water in 1993 and 2011 in non-mining and mining 
districts 
 Poverty 2011 Average annual 
budget 2008-2011 
Average access to 
water 1993 
Average access to 
water 2011 
Non-mining districts 47.1% 10,062,860 20.3% 51.1% 
Mining districts 32.7% 22,792,521 20.2% 46.7% 
Total average 46.1% 10,912,525 20.3% 50.8% 
Source: INEI, Own elaboration 
 
To statistically assess these findings, I carried out a quantitative analysis of the determinants of 
water access on a district level in Peru and found that mining indeed has statistically significant 
negative impact on access to water when controlling for district specific characteristics. 
Methodology and results of this analysis are presented in chapter 3 and 4.  
The local governments have the main responsibility for providing drinking water to the 
local population and play a crucial role in the connection between the mining industry and its 
impact on society. Since 2002, the local governments’ role in development in Peru has gained 
importance due to decentralization policies (Serrano; Acosta, 2011). Peru is a unitary country with 
three tiers of government (central, regional and local). The local level includes 1838 districts and 
194 provinces. In this study, however, when I discuss local governments, I am referring to district 
level governmental entities and provincial capitals (which are also districts). I only include the 
provinces in the discussion about “administrative distance” to the mines when looking at spillover 
effects of mining onto neighboring districts. The regional level includes the departments. 
Throughout this study I will refer to local and regional governments when addressing the 
governmental entities of districts and departments and refer to districts, provinces and departments 
when addressing the geographic areas they make out. 
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Diagram 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MEF - SIAF/SP 
 
As of 2012, 16.5% of public spending was located at the local governmental level and 15.4% on a 
regional level (Serrano; Acosta, 2011). These numbers imply that Peru’s spending is relatively 
decentralized when it comes to public spending, even compared to some of Europe’s relatively 
decentralized countries (Rosales, 2012:43). In addition, around 40% of all public investments are 
carried out on a local level (see diagram 4). The increased importance of local government in 
public investment is related to the growth of the canon minero. The canon minero is the public 
income, generated from the corporate tax paid by mining companies, transferred from the central 
to the regional and local governments where the mines are located. Due to the growth of the mining 
production in the country the canon minero is today one of the main sources of income in mining 
regions. I will return to the canon minero, but worth mentioning is that mining, due to the canon, 
does not only have a direct effect on society, but also an indirect effect through the fiscal transfer 
system. An effect important to account for when assessing the impact of mining. 
Basically, this study proposes therefore that if mining has an impact on access to water it 
must occur through its interaction with local governments. In consequence, I explore the potential 
channels of influence by assessing the political economy of mining on a local level in Peru and, in 
addition, I quantitatively assess the impact of mining on the investment behavior of local 
governments during the years preceding 2011, which is my base year. My findings suggest that 
mining has a negative effect on the propensity to invest in water and sanitation. Instead, mining 
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districts tend to have a higher propensity to invest in infrastructure, an investment area promoted 
by the mining industry.  
Before jumping to conclusions, however, the section below provides key information to 
understand the forces at work in the interaction between mining, local communities and local 
governments. The demand of water in mining production is an important component to understand 
the incentive scheme of the mining industry. The overall importance of the water issue in Peru is 
highlighted in the section on the social conflicts related to mining which helps understand the 
context of the issue at hand. Previous findings on the impact of mining is discussed in the third 
part and finally, the political economy of mining in local governments explores the forces at work 
in public decision making on a local level to understand what governs investment behavior of local 
governments in relation to mining. 
 
2.2. Water and Mining 
 
Mining is a water intensive industry and mineral deposits tend to be located in areas where water 
is scarce (Budds; Hinojosa, 2012). Water has historically been considered a never-ending common 
good. However, due to the growing scarcity of water supply it is considered one of the major 
challenges for further expansion of the mining industry (Wiertz, 2008). Even though Peru has the 
highest per capita availability of renewable freshwater in Latin America, the resources are 
unequally distributed in the country (Olson in Giugale, et al, 2007:409). Two thirds of the 
population live on the dry side of the Andean ridge, where only 2 % of the water resources are 
found (Bebbington; Williams, 2008). In the mountain area, where most of the mining is located, 
the freshwater availability is 48 % of the national average of 77,600 cubic meters per person per 
year (Olson in Giugale, et al, 2007:409). In addition to the scarcity of water supply in the most 
populated parts of the country, the country is also suffering the consequences of climate change 
with melting glaciers which is endangering the already scarce supply. For these reasons, Peru is 
considered South America’s most water stressed country (Bebbington; Williams, 2008). 
Agriculture consume about 80 % of the total water consumption and the mining industry 
accounts for about 5 % of the total water use in the country. However, mines do not, as some 
farmers do, have to pay for the water they use (The Economist, 2005). According to Scurrah 
(2008), the impact of mining on water is serious both in terms of quality and quantity, especially 
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in areas where water shortage is critical and where mines are located in connection to the main 
drainage basins for water collection. Population living in mining areas have observed that river 
flows have diminished resulting in a lower turnaround in agricultural production. In addition, 
health studies on children in mining areas found high levels of contamination both in areas directly 
affected as well as neighboring areas. In consequence, the impact of mining on water supply seems 
to go beyond the 5 % of total water usage as an industry by also affecting downstream water 
availability as well as the quality of water supply (Bebbington; Williams, 2008). 
 
2.3. Mining and Social Conflicts 
 
Social conflicts have arisen opposing the expansion and operation of mining. At the core of many 
of these conflicts is the concern regarding water quality and water access. As noted by the World 
Bank (2005:105), the majority of social conflicts in Peru regards the environmental concern of 
mining’s effects on the usage of natural resources and health. These concerns are not new. In the 
city of Llo, the civil society managed to take their case against the Southern Copper Corporation 
to the International Water Tribunal in The Hague in 1992 (Scurrah, 2008). However, with the 
growth of mining activities in the country, the amount of social conflicts have increased with 300% 
during the last five years (The Economist, 2012). The Peruvian Ombudsman reports 149 social 
disputes involving extractive industries and the action taken by the state to mitigate these conflicts 
have failed (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2012; De Echave, et al, 2009).  
The social conflicts, which left 2312 wounded and caused 195 dead between 2001-2006 
(Defensoria del pueblo, 2012), involved the mining companies, the governments (national, 
regional and local) and discontent local communities (Thomson, 2013). In a study on the impact 
of the largest gold mine in Peru, Yanacocha, the population in the surrounding areas expressed 
discontent for feeling excluded from economic opportunities and benefits generated from the 
mining: “More people came to the city, but public services did not improve – all that has added up 
to a huge sense of resentment” (Kemp, et al, 2012). Research indicates, in addition, that the reasons 
behind this development is not only related to the expansion of mining but also caused by the 
design of decentralization policies (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011). Other studies highlight the 
importance to include local government capacity and management when understanding the causes 
of social conflicts (Wilson, 2012). To understand the impact of mining it seems therefore crucial 
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to study the relation between local governments, communities and mining companies and analyze 
the policies and practices that govern these relations. Before turning to the political economy of 
mining on a local level in Peru; an overview of the global discussion on the potential effects of 
mining as well as previous studies assessing the effects of mining on a district level in Peru is 
presented below. 
 
2.4. The Effects of Mining – a literature overview 
 
The international discourse on the relationship between development and mining is highly divided 
and politically charged. Financial institutions and international organizations, such as the World 
Bank and the IMF, plus most governments represent the supporters of the idea that extractive 
industries offer an opportunity for development countries to reduce poverty (The World Bank, 
2005). A more skeptical outlook on the potential of exploitation of natural resources for 
development in developing countries is a stream within literature usually referred to as “the curse 
of natural resources” or “the paradox of plenty” and is mainly represented by academics (for 
example, Auty, 1993, 2001; Sachs, Warner, 1995; ) and NGOs.  
The arguments in support of mining follow the liberal discourse of the benefit of foreign 
direct investments which bring capital and technology to the country generating spillover effects. 
It argues that backward linkages, such as the increased purchasing power of workers in the mines 
increases demand for local products generating growth. The resources generated by the central 
government, if managed correctly, also offers an opportunity to improve education, health and 
infrastructure through investments, decreasing poverty and benefitting the entire economy (The 
World Bank, 2002:3).  
“The curse of natural recourses” was originally related to the economic concept of the 
Dutch Disease hypothesis, which states that sudden income increase caused by the discovery of 
natural resources can reduce income due to an appreciation of the exchange rate. A later stream of 
theories, however, pointed to the political effects of the exploitation of natural resources in a 
context of weak institutions and poverty, leading to higher risks of political and social conflicts, 
corruption and even civil war (Brollo, et al, 2009). 
So what effect has mining had in the case of Peru? A number of quantitative studies have 
assessed this relationship with varying results. Most of these studies follow the liberal discourse 
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by focusing on potential backward linkages and spillover effects due to mining. Few of them have 
discussed or included the role of the public institutions. Loayza, et al (2013), look at the impact of 
mining on a number of socioeconomic indicators on a district level using data from 2007. Their 
results suggest that mining has increased household consumption, decreased extreme poverty and 
improved literacy rates. However, mining industry has also increased economic inequality in the 
producing districts and their surroundings. Zegarra, et al (2006), Arágon and Rud (2009) and 
Macroconsult (2012) also identified a positive impact on real income and poverty reduction. 
However, some of the studies indicate that the positive result depends on a number of 
circumstantial factors. Ticci (2011) found that the effect on income depends on household level 
traits. She argues that the establishment of a mining industry in a community leads to a “de-
agrarization” and that the rural population actually is negatively affected. A similar result of the 
displacement of the agrarian industry is identified by Zegarra, et al (2006). These results, however, 
are not confirmed in the study made by Macroconsult (2012) with data from 2010. He finds that 
the urban households tend to benefit more from mining but that there is no negative impact on the 
agricultural industry as a consequence of mining. Macroconsult also found a positive effect for 
health, education and human development. The only study I could find which could not identify 
any effects on socioeconomic indicators was Arellano-Yanguas (2010) by using department panel 
data for the years 2002-2008. Interestingly, this is the only study integrating both the direct effect 
of mining and the indirect effect it has on local government through the canon minero 
simultaneously. 
When it comes to the effect of mining on access to water and sanitation on a district level, 
the results are more ambiguous. Loayza, et al (2013), using data from 2007 and Macroconsult 
(2012) using data from 2010 could not establish any relation between mining and access to water. 
Ticci (2011) using data from 2007 and Zegarra, et al (2006) using data from 2005 found a negative 
effect of mining on water access for the rural population. Del Pozo, et al (2012) looked at the 
impact of the canon minero, on the access to water and also found a negative effect for the rural 
population using 2011 data, they did not however account for the direct effect of mining.  
Del Pozo, et al (2012) believe that the result could be a consequence of an increased 
competition for water resources in districts where the mining industry is active. Ticci (2011) and 
Zegarra, et al (2006) argued instead that the result could be related to central state prioritization in 
distributing means to invest in water coverage. The central state might assume that the income 
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generated from the mining industry are sufficient for providing basic services for its population 
and therefore choose not to invest more in these communities. The latter theory is not plausible, 
however, since local governments are responsible for providing water and sanitation services and 
that the inter-governmental transfer systems are pre-determined. Tax revenues are not arbitrarily 
distributed according to where the central state believes they are needed.  
Surprisingly, only one of the studies that I have come across mentions the possibility that 
the reason behind the result may be due to the effect that mining presence has on the investment 
prioritization of local governments. Arellano-Yanguas (2010) assesses the budgetary procedure of 
local governmental spending of the canon minero and finds that the system incentivizes local 
governments to prioritize simpler, short-term investments, which may lead to less water and 
sanitation investments in canon-rich districts since they tend to be technically cumbersome and 
expensive. He does not go into the possibility that the effect may be due to the influence of the 
mining industry and he does not control for the presence of mining when looking at the effect of 
the canon. I will return to his findings in the next section.  
An important part of “the curse of natural resources” is the theory that mining can have 
potentially negative effects when established in a context with weak public institutions. To 
understand the effects of mining it is therefore important to include the local governments to the 
analysis. This study intends to contribute to the research on the effects of mining by turning to the 
local governments and assess how their investment behavior is affected by mining. To be able to 
understand how mining may affect local government behavior it is important to include a 
discussion about the forces that govern local government decision making in Peru. The next section 
therefore assesses the political economy of mining on a local level in Peru.  
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2.5. Political Economy of Mining – direct and indirect effects of 
mining on local governments’ investment prioritization 
 
To understand the impact of mining on society it is necessary to include the role of the public 
sector, especially the local governments. This is recognized by the literature focused on 
understanding the underlying reasons behind social unrest connected to the mining industry 
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Wilson, 2012; De Echave, et al, 2009). This study looks closer at the 
impact of mining on local governments’ investments behavior to try to explain its effect on water 
access. But what are the forces governing public decision making on a local level in Peru? To 
answer that question, this section explores the subordination of the state in relation to the mining 
industry and the design and effects of the decentralization policies that have shaped the role of 
local governments in modern Peru. The purpose is to identify the direct and indirect effects that 
mining can have on local decision making and develop a framework that will be useful when 
discussing the results of the quantitative analysis in the second part of the study.  
The economic liberalization policies, backed by the World Bank, that were implemented 
during the nineties under the presidency of Alberto Fujimori enforced the already strong influence 
of the private sector over the state (De Echeve, 2009:292-296). De-regularization, privatization 
and tax cuts were adapted to attract foreign investments, especially in mining. The reforms, in 
combination with favorable development of world prices, have been successful in the sense that 
mineral export has expanded. However, low tax rates and limited restrictions have been sustained 
even after mineral prices sky rocketed and profits grew (Wilson, 2012). The weakness of the state 
in relation to the mining industry is clear when looking at the last decade’s mining regulations in 
Peru which has been consistently responsive to the mining industry’s interests (Arellano-Yanguas, 
2010:22;66).  
As discussed above, the mining activities have provoked public discontent in Peru. To 
tackle these issues, mining companies and international institutions have promoted the need of 
decentralization to enhance local development and participation and, in addition, Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CRS) as a strategy to mitigate the risk of conflict (Arellano-Yanguas, 2010:14). 
Peru has embraced this local development approach by implementing a revenue-sharing transfer 
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system called the canon minero and by promoting the participation of mining companies in the 
local decision making through the Mining Programme of Solidarity with the People (MPSP).  
 
2.5.1. Indirect effects of mining – the canon minero 
 
In 2002, the government embarked on a decentralization reform process mainly entailing the 
transfer of responsibilities and fiscal resources to local and regional governments. Since then, 50% 
of the taxes collected from the mining companies has been transferred to the subnational 
governments (Wilson, 2012). The design of the transfer system is summarized in the table below. 
Distribution is primarily favoring the areas where the mines are located and the surrounding areas. 
The main purpose behind the distribution design was, hence, to mitigate social unrest by promoting 
fiscal participation (Arellano-Yanguas, 2010:18). However, the canon minero has also, in 
consequence, substantially increased horizontal inequality between local governments. 
 
Table 2 – Distribution scheme of the canon minero 
 Canon Minero (50% of 
corporate income tax paid by 
the mining companies) 
To the local governments of mining district 10% 
To local governments of non-mining districts within a mining province 25% 
To local governments of non-mining districts within a mining 
department 
40% 
To regional governments in mining departments  20% 
To universities in a mining department 5% 
Source: MEF 
 
The canon minero is earmarked for capital investments and is supposed of be used for investments 
in infrastructure, water and electricity. As a consequence of the mining boom, previously poor 
municipalities are now receiving millions of dollars in tax-revenues. The growth of the canon 
minero is illustrated below. 
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Diagram 5 
 
Source: Macroconsult (2012) 
 
Problems have arisen in relation to the management and execution of the canon minero. The funds 
are not being executed properly and findings indicate that they are also being spent inadequately. 
Less than 50% of the canon was executed in 2011. Lack of administrative capacity and 
intergovernmental coordination have been pinpointed as potential reasons behind the local 
governments’ low execution rates (Loayza, et al, 2012). In addition, studies indicate that the 
revenues may lead to increased corruption of public functionaries (Maldonado, 2011). Wilson 
(2012) argues that the inability of subnational governments to use the canon minero to promote 
local development fuels the anti-mining sentiments of the population. This is also supported by 
quantitative assessment by Arellano-Yanguas (2011).  
The inability to efficiently use the resources stemming from the mining industry cannot 
explain why mining districts have a lower access to water than the non-mining districts. A negative 
relation could only be explain by either the competition argument presented by Del Pozo, et al 
(2012); that the lack of water supply due to mining is causing limiting the local government’s 
ability to expand the public water system; or that the local governments prioritize investments in 
other areas than water and that this somehow is related to the presence of mining. In the following 
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part, we are going to explore this last theory. What governs local governments’ decision making 
regime? 
Arellano-Yanguas (2010:170) turns away from the lack-of-capacity argument related to 
local spending of the canon minero. He argues instead that the resources are being poorly spent 
due to the structure of the budgetary system in Peru. This is supported by Von Hesse (2011) who 
observes that the canon is being spent without considering the immediate needs of the local 
population. Local government execution of capital budgets is connected to rather cumbersome 
administrative procedures. In addition, due to the rapid growth of the canon, it has been difficult 
for the local government to foresee how large their capital budget is going to be, making planning 
difficult. Since total execution rates of budgets, regardless of the quality of projects carried out, is 
a measurement of government capacity in Peru, this has incentivized local governments to 
prioritize short term; “easy” and “visible” projects. Since investments in water and sanitation have 
a greater technical sophistication and take a longer time to implement, these projects have been 
neglected in local governments receiving a large percentage of their budgets from the canon 
minero. Arellano-Yanguas (2010:181) finds support for this argument by looking at the correlation 
between the canon minero and sector specific investments. Although, in his assessment he did not 
account for the potential direct effect of mining on investment prioritization. 
In addition to affecting the governments receiving the canon minero, the potential chance 
of receiving revenues from the canon in the future may affect local governments’ behavior as they 
try to attract mining companies to come to their territory. Water resources can function as leverage 
in negotiation with prospect mining companies (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011:137). Even though this 
is not implied by Arellano-Yanguas, the leverage gained by having access to water resources could 
arguably attribute to why local government choose not to exploit these water resources by 
investing in expanding the public water system for the population. This could affect non-mining 
districts with proximity to mines, where the potential for mining is higher. Neighboring districts 
hoping to attract mining may also choose to invest in infrastructure rather than water, for the same 
reason.  
The effect of the canon minero on access to water and investment prioritization of local 
governments can be captured by including the dependence on the canon minero (the percentage of 
the total budget made up by canon transfers). According to the discussion above, the effect may 
either be a no-effect due to the lack of capacity of local governments to use the resources stemming 
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from the canon or a negative effect on the propensity to invest in water and sanitation due to the 
complexity of these projects. In addition, my observations suggest that the effect of the canon may 
expand to the neighboring districts in mining areas whose investment behavior is affected by the 
incentives to attract mining companies to their territory to gain access to the canon revenues. 
Although, in that case, the effect is not captured in the canon variable, but rather in the variable 
related to administrative proximity to mining districts.  
 
2.5.2. Direct effects of mining – the participation of mining companies in 
local development 
 
In addition to the indirect effect of mining through the canon minero on investment behavior, there 
is evidence supporting that there is a direct effect due to the presence of mining. As mentioned, 
the second trait of the decentralization process in Peru is related to participation. Participatory 
budgeting became mandatory in 2002 and one of the objectives of this reform was to “promote 
non-state investments through the involvement of the private sector in the budgetary process” 
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2010:177). Public investment projects are approved by coordinating councils 
and potential participants register to take part of this process through both public and private 
meetings with local officials. This makes the understanding of the forces at work in public 
investment procedures a rather complex endeavor. Field work would be needed to fully understand 
the importance of these channels for influencing local functionaries. However, due to the weak 
position of the state in Peru it is probable to assume that it may be rather easy to influence the 
decision making process on a local level in Peru. For example, observations such as the fact that 
consultants hired to propose development plans for districts often are selected by mining 
companies and that mining companies relatively easy can buy political support on a local level in 
Peru support this notion (Arellano-Yanguas, 2010:177; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011). 
The mining companies also engage in local development in a direct way through the MPSP, 
mentioned above. As a rather criticized response to the social pressure to introduce a windfall tax 
on mining, the Peruvian president at the time Alan Garcia, came to an agreement with the mining 
companies. They would avoid paying the tax if they agreed to contribute parts of their profits, on 
a voluntary basis, in social development projects in the local communities surrounding the mines. 
The initiative clearly illustrates the weakness of the state in relation to the mining industry. The 
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idea was that the MPSP would encourage the mining companies to become active participants in 
the local decision making and “give back” to society. In consequence, the mining companies can 
set their own agenda and the projects, which tend to be carried out by external NGOs or 
consultants, are mostly short sighted and more or less coordinated with local demands (Lemieux, 
2010). Based on this, it is not clear how the participation of mining in local development could 
affect the decision making process of local governments. It is possible that the application of the 
mining industry’s social agenda developed by a top-down approach (using external actors) may 
affect the local governments own political agenda (Lemieux, 2010). Observations on mining 
companies’ engagement in community development projects in Peru also suggest that the co-
participation of state and mining in social programs is common but that the level of cooperation 
depends on the attitude the local governments have towards the mining industry (Echavarria; 
Gonzalez, 2003).  
Since water tend to be scarce in areas where the mining industry is active, it is probable 
that mining companies themselves will not prioritize projects in water and sanitation for the 
population through the MPSP and other CSR initiatives. In addition, the mining industry may use 
formal channels to participate in the budget planning in an attempt to push the local governments 
to invest less in water and more in areas which would benefit the industry, such as infrastructure. 
Finally, the local governments themselves have incentives to meet the demands of the mining 
industry to maintain or gain future access to the substantial revenues received through the canon 
minero. The budgetary procedure of the canon minero may also push the governments to prioritize 
short term projects instead of the more demanding and long term water and sanitation investments. 
In sum, mining may affect local decision making through various indirect, semi-direct and direct 
channels. The simplified figure below illustrates the channels of influence discussed in this section. 
I refer to these channels when discussing the results.  
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Figure 1 – Channels through which mining potentially affects local government investment 
prioritization in relation to propensity to invest in water 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
In the following part, I will describe the methodology used to quantitatively assess the impact of 
mining on access to water on a district level and on the local governments’ investment behavior. I 
am using two models, an OLS for the cross-sectional dataset with the percentage of households in 
each district with access to the public water system as a dependent variable; and a probit model 
using the propensity to invest in water and sanitation and infrastructure respectively as a dependent 
variable. Before going into more detail about the models, I will discuss the data used in the study. 
In the final part of this section, I will also motivate briefly the inclusion of control variables.   
 
3.1. Data 
 
The data used in the study is composed of public data. The main data is from 2011, which is the 
base year of the study. The socioeconomic variables are from the Peruvian household survey 
(ENAHO, 2011), administrated by the Peruvian Statistical Institute (INEI). The data is not 
complete since observations are missing for a number of districts. But since observations are 
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omitted at random, I do not believe this will affect the overall result. The pre mining boom water 
coverage variable is from the 1993 population census (INEI). The mining data is collected from 
the Ministry of Energy and Mines’ (MEM) annual reports and includes the location and size of 
mining production. Mining data consists of silver, gold, lead, tin, iron, zinc, copper, tungsten and 
molybdenum mines. The mineral production is divided into large scale and small scale mines. Data 
includes the total monthly production in different weight units for each mineral. In this study, I did 
not take into account the number of mines nor the total size of production in each district and 
focused solely on the presence of mining within a district. I excluded the small scale and artisanal 
mining using MEM’s definitions.  
Data on public investments originate from the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MEF) 
and contains over 76000 local government investments. The data is administered by the national 
system of public investments (SNIP). The investments are categorized by SNIP in the following 
areas: education, water and sanitation, commerce and industry, infrastructure, energy, labor, 
housing and urban development, health, communication, administration and planning, agriculture 
and environment, defense and security. I will use their categorization as I analyze investment 
behavior. They were carried out between 2005 and 2013. However, I will only use the investments 
preceding my base year, which is 2011. Of particular interest are the investments in water and 
sanitation and infrastructure. The investments in water and sanitation include primarily expansions 
of the public water system and improvements of the existing system. Investments in infrastructure 
include all investments related to the expansion and improvements of roads. Only 13 of Peru’s 25 
departments are included in the data. Fortunately, though, these 13 departments cover most of the 
mining producing areas.   
The socioeconomic variables and the public investment data were passed on to me by the 
team at Public Sector Development in Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank. I 
express my gratitude to them for kindly allowing me to use the data. With the help of these data, 
the following variables were constructed: 
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Table 3 - List of variables 
Variables Units Explanations 
Dependent variables   
Access to public water, 2011 Percentage Households connected to the 
public water system, ENAHO* 
Propensity to invest in water and 
sanitation 
Dummy variable 1 if investment in w&s, 0 
otherwise for public investments, 
using district level capital 
investments, 2005-2011 
Propensity to invest in 
infrastructure 
Dummy variable 1 if investment in infrastructure, 0 
otherwise, 2005-2011 
   
Control variables    
Population, 2011 Sum in logs ENAHO* 
Poverty, 2011 Percentage Share of population in poverty, 
ENAHO* 
Rural population, 2011 Percentage ENAHO* 
Inequality, 2009 Gini (0-1)  
Access to water and sanitation, 
1993 (before the mining boom) 
Percentage  Households connected to the 
public water system 
Size of budget, 2008-2011 Sum in logs Average size of PIM (before 
execution) 
Dependence on income from the 
Canon, 2011 
Percentage District income originating from 
mining tax as a percentage of total 
budget (PIM) 
Number of public employees, 
2011 
Sum in logs  
Local government capital budget 
execution rate (government 
efficiency), 2008-2010 
Percentage Share of capital budget executed, 
average 2008-2010 
Provincial capital dummy Dummy 1 if district is capital in province, 0 
otherwise 
* ENAHO from 2011 is a census done on a household level. Given that the sample of households is representative on 
a district level it is possible to estimate the total amount of each variable on a district, province and department level. 
In this study we assume the samples from each district are representative to make it possible to generalize the result 
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to a district level. It is important however to keep in mind that the data coming from the ENAHO, 2011 census are 
estimation and not exact figures.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
To assess the impact of mining on access to water and local government investment behavior, I 
use two different approaches. In the first model, the percentage of households with access to the 
public water system on a district level is the dependent variable and an OLS approach is applied. 
In the second model, I use a probit approach since the dependent variable is a binary variable 
indicating the propensity to invest in water and sanitation and infrastructure respectively. Before 
formally specifying the models, I describe the definition of a mining districts used in the study and 
my strategy to account for problems due to heterogeneity.  
The methodology primarily draws from a study by Loayza, Mier y Teran and Rigolini 
(2013), which assesses the impact of mining on a number of socioeconomic indicators. To avoid 
issues related to heterogeneity, a common occurrence in cross-sectional studies, mining districts 
have to be compared to non-mining districts with institutional and geographical similarities. 
However, before identifying a comparable group of districts, I need to differentiate the mining 
districts from the non-mining districts. I used the database from the Ministry of Energy and Mining 
(MEM) to pin down the location and size of all mineral production in Peru during the last decade. 
I excluded all small and artisanal mining production, using the definition from MEM. For the first 
model, my base year is 2011, thus, I decided to focus on the districts with significant mining 
production during the years preceding that year. I defined all the district with large scale mining 
production between the years 2006-2010 as mining districts. This tactic is in line with Loayza, et 
al (2013) although their base year is 2007. For the second model, the sample is made up by local 
government investments and not districts. The investments are therefore matched with the presence 
of mining production in the district during the year in which the investment was carried out.  
The districts are grouped in three categories; 1) mining districts, 2) non-mining districts in 
mining provinces (provinces with at least one other mining district) and 3) non-mining districts in 
non-mining provinces in a mining department. In this way, it is possible to assess how the effect 
of mining is related to “administrative distance” to the mine. It is likely that spillover effects 
between districts within the same province exist and by using this categorization it is possible to 
analyze these effects. Loayza, et al (2013) used mapping software to address the impact of 
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geographic proximity looking at the impact of mining on first- and second neighbors to the mining 
districts. The results were identical to the results using administrative proximity. I will therefore 
think of the administrative proximity specification used in this paper as an indication of a 
“neighbor effect” due to geographical as well as administrative proximity.  
As can be noted in the categorization above, the non-mining departments are not included. 
This is a strategy to handle the mentioned heterogeneity problem and is in line with the strategy 
used in Loayza, et al (2013). Basically, the geographical, institutional and other systematic 
differences between the non-mining and mining regions could result in biases which may be 
cumbersome to account for by using control variables causing omitted variable biases. For this 
reason, the non-mining departments are excluded. In view of that, I also excluded the department 
of Lima, even though it has districts with mining production. Thus, for the first model, my baseline 
case consists of 1319 districts belonging to departments in which at least one district hosts mining 
production. These districts are primarily concentrated in the Andean region. I also introduced 
department dummies to capture additional effects caused by time invariant unobservable 
characteristics not picked up by the control variables.  
To estimate the effect of the canon minero, I include a variable called dependence on canon 
minero. It is specified as the percentage of the total budget made up by income from the canon. 
Since the total budget size is included as a control variable, the variables capture both the effect of 
the size of the canon as well as the dependence on the canon. As discussed above, the effect of the 
canon minero is expected to be zero according to the no-effect argument stressing lack of local 
government capacity or negative due to the budgetary rules connected to the execution of the 
canon. The inclusion of the variable is not completely unproblematic. Since the variable is highly 
related to mining it may be difficult to separate the effect caused by the canon and the effect caused 
by mining. In addition, one part of the canon is distributed according to socioeconomic 
characteristics and access to basic services (including water) is included in the distribution scheme. 
This may cause endogeneity problems. However, the effect is minimal since a very small part of 
the canon is distributed in accordance to local needs. Because of the above mentioned issues 
related to the canon minero, I include one specification without the canon variable to see if this 
changes the results.  
To isolate the effect of mining I control for a number of districts characteristics. The control 
variables are discussed and motivated in a separate section. Worth noting here, though, is that 
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while Loayza, et al (2013) used control variables from before the mining boom (1993) this study 
includes contemporary variables primarily from 2011. Thanks to the richness of the database at 
hand, more control variables have been included.  
The first model assesses the impact of mining on district level access to water. It can be formally 
defined as follows: 
(1) 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑑𝑝 =∝ +𝛽0𝐷𝑑𝑝[𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟. ] + 𝛽1𝐷𝑑𝑝[𝑛𝑜𝑛 −
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣. ] + 𝛽2[𝐷𝑒𝑝. 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜]  +
𝛽3Control𝑑𝑝 + 𝜇𝑑 + 𝜐𝑝 + 𝜀𝑑𝑝  
where 𝐷𝑑𝑝[𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟. ] is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the district is producing 
and zero if the district is non-producing. Thus, the parameter 𝛽0 will give us the impact of mining 
on a district level. The dummy variable  𝐷𝑑𝑝[𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣. ] takes the 
value of one if the district is located within a province that at least one producing district and zero 
otherwise. Its parameter 𝛽1  will, hence, indicate how the impact of mining is affected by 
administrative distance. The effect of the dependence on canon minero is given by the value of 𝛽2. 
The control variables and the regional dummies are included in Control𝑑𝑝 .  
The subscription relates to the department, d, and province, p, to which each district 
belongs. Since there are department specific and province specific institutional traits assumed to 
be shared among the districts belonging to the same province and department respectively, there 
will be specific error terms for departments, provinces and districts, represented by 𝜇𝑑,  𝜐𝑝 and 
 𝜀𝑑𝑝. By introducing the department fixed effects, we account for the omitted variable bias caused 
by the department specific traits. In this study, I am not accounting for province specific traits. 
Partly because the importance of the province is politically limited and the inclusion of provincial 
dummies would therefore not add much value to the analysis in relation to the reduction in degrees 
of freedom it would cause; and partly because I am including dummies indicating if a local 
government is a provincial capital and hence accounting for some of heterogeneity caused by the 
provincial administrative tier without affecting the degrees of freedom. 
I use the second model to assess the impact of mining on the propensity of the local 
governments to invest in water and sanitation, and infrastructure respectively. Hence, two 
specification of the same model is included. The dependent variables in both specifications are 
binary and a probit model is applied. The database with public investments only includes data from 
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districts located in 13 of the 25 departments2 in Peru. Hence, the results are less general in this 
model than in the first model but since the selection has been determined without keeping the 
mining industry’s location in mind; the risk of a selection bias is not imminent. Fortunately for this 
study, the most important mining departments are included in the sample and since the non-mining 
departments are excluded from the sample, in line with previous discussion, the lack of data from 
these departments does not cause a problem.  
I use investments carried out from 2005-2010 which are the years preceding the base year 
of the first model. I match each investment with the presence of mining in that district at the year 
in which the investment was carried out. I mainly use the same control variables as in the first 
model. These variables are primarily from 2011 and are therefore not always corresponding to the 
timing of investments. If the district characteristics included in the control variables have changed 
dramatically during 2005-2011 and especially if the development of the variables have been 
different for a certain group of districts, this may cause a problem.  For now, however, it will be 
assumed that the variables for 2011 are efficient proxies for the same characteristics during the 
preceding years, which I believe is a reasonable assumption. The first of the two specifications of 
the second model focuses on the propensity to invest in water and sanitation and is formally 
specified as follows: 
(2) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑝 =∝
+𝛽0𝐷𝑑𝑝[𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟. ] + 𝛽1𝐷𝑑𝑝[𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣. ] +
𝛽2[𝐷𝑒𝑝. 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜] + 𝛽3Control𝑑𝑝 + 𝜇𝑑 + 𝜐𝑝 + 𝜀𝑑𝑝 
Where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a binary variable taking the value of 
one if the investment is in water and sanitation and zero otherwise. The rest of the model is 
identical to regression (1). However, some of the control variables are different. For example, the 
water coverage which is the dependent variable in regression (1) is included as an independent in 
regression (2). The second specification focusing on the propensity to invest in infrastructure is 
included below: 
                                                             
2  AMAZONAS, ANCASH, APURIMAC, AREQUIPA, AYACUCHO, CAJAMARCA, CALLAO, CUSCO, 
HUANCAVELICA, HUANUCO, ICA, JUNIN, LA LIBERTAD 
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(3) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑝 =∝ +𝛽0𝐷𝑑𝑝[𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟. ] +
𝛽1𝐷𝑑𝑝[𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣. ] + 𝛽2[𝐷𝑒𝑝. 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜] +
𝛽3Control𝑑𝑝 + 𝜇𝑑 + 𝜐𝑝 + 𝜀𝑑𝑝 
Where the dependent variable takes the value of one if it is an investment in infrastructure and zero 
otherwise. In this model, the control variables related to access to water are excluded. 
 
3.3. Control Variables 
The control variables included in the models are listed in Table 1. The variables are selected 
because they are believed to somehow affect the district level access to water and/or the 
investments behavior of local governments. The inclusion of each variable is motivated below.  
Population size and poverty are included to capture differences in demand and supply (with 
a higher degree of rural population it could be more difficult to construct water systems due to a 
disperse population). Inequality could have a negative effect on access to water since it could 
disrupt the prioritization of investment decisions in the public sector, as seen in Urzua, (2012).   
Access to public water system prior to the mining boom (1993) is included to control for 
any pre-boom differences between the districts (see for example Loayza, et al (2013) and Arellano-
Yanguas, 2010).  
The total size of the budget, the number of employees and the average execution rate 2008-
2010 are included as different estimates reflecting local government capacity and efficiency.  
Finally, a provincial capital dummy is included. Each province contains a “provincial district” 
which functions as the administrative center of the province and enjoy certain perks. A dummy is 
included to account for this. 
 
 
4. Results 
In the following section, I present the results from the quantitative assessments. The first part 
includes the results from the OLS model estimating the impact of mining on district level access 
to water. In part two, the impact of mining on the propensity to invest in water and sanitation and 
infrastructure respectively is assessed.  
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4.1. Part one – Impact of mining on local access of water 
 
Results from regression (1) is displayed in Table 2 below. Due to missing observation 709 districts 
are assessed out of the 1319 in the sample. Four specifications of the model are assessed. The first 
two specifications accounts for the dependence on the tax income generated from the mining 
industry (Dependence on canon). In specification two and four, regional dummies have been 
included to account for fixed differences between regions. As previously mentioned, the result 
indicates that mining has a negative effect on water coverage on a district level. A direct proximity 
to the mining industry seems to be detrimental for access to water. An administrative proximity 
can, on the other hand, be positive as measured by the value of β1. According to the results, mining 
has a negative effect on districts directly impacted by the mines but may have a positive impact on 
the surrounding districts within the same province. The results remains as we introduce fixed 
effects with the department dummies.  
The dependence of the canon on access to water has no effect according to the results. As 
I have discussed throughout the paper, the canon is one of the major sources of income for mining 
districts. As argued above, the canon could be expected to either have a no-effect or a negative 
effect. It seems as though my results are in line with the argument stressing a no-effect of the canon 
due to lack of capacity of local government, at least on the actual water coverage rate in the 
districts. The results suggest, instead that the mere presence of mining production (direct effect) is 
what affects the level of access to water observed in mining districts.  
 
Table 4 – OLS: Impact of Mining on Access to Water on a District Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mining district dummy (β0) -0.125** 
(0.054) 
-0.091** 
(0.053) 
-0.125** 
(0.053) 
-0.089** 
(0.053) 
Mining province dummy (β1) 0.028* 
(0.032) 
0.056** 
(0.032) 
0.027* 
(0.031) 
0.058** 
(0.032) 
Dependence on canon (β2) -0.010 
(0.084) 
0.055 
(0.093) 
  
Control variables     
Total budget -0.072*** -0.073** -0.074*** -0.067** 
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Provincial capital 0.094** 0.084** 0.095** 0.077** 
Population 0.067*** 0.063** 0.068*** 0.061** 
Rural population -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Poverty rate -0.285*** -0.381*** -0.284*** -0.380*** 
Water coverage 1993 -0.007 -0.047* -0.007 -0.047 
Inequality -0.374* -0.443* -0.372* -0.441* 
Local gov. employees -0.005 0.008 -0.005 0.007 
Budget execution rate -0.166* 0.000 -0.165* -0.016 
Department dummies  YES  YES 
_cons 1.594*** 1.607*** 1.609*** 1.580*** 
     
N 709 709 709 709 
r2 0.188 0.294 0.188 0.294 
 
 
4.2. Part two – Impact of mining on local government investment 
prioritization  
 
From part one, I have concluded that mining tend to have a negative effect on access to water on 
a district level and a positive effect on water for the district belonging to the same province as the 
mining district. To see if this result can be explained by how the investment prioritization of local 
governments is affected by the presence of mining and the dependence on the canon minero, I am 
assessing the propensity to invest in water and sanitation and infrastructure respectively for the 
years preceding my base year 2011 (2005-2010).  
 
4.2.1. Propensity to invest in water and sanitation 
 
The results from regression (2) are presented in Table 3. Specification one and two includes the 
dependence of local governments on income from the canon. Specification two and four includes 
regional dummies. The results are in line with expectations. Mining seems to have a negative effect 
on the propensity to invest in water and sanitation. Mining also seem to have a negative effect on 
Alvina Erman, 880412-7002   
   
 
32 
 
the propensity to invest in water and sanitation of non-mining districts belonging to provinces with 
at least one mining district. When accounting for regional differences, the tendency is enforced 
and the negative effect become highly significant for districts. Accordingly, it seems as though the 
assumption that the relation between mining and water coverage works through the investment 
behavior of the local governments is valid.  
The results also indicate the presence of a spillover effect on the districts belonging to the 
same province as the producing district. This spillover effect do not seem to have affected the 
overall effect on access to water, since mining had a positive impact on those districts according 
to the results from part one. It is arguable that the impact of mining on neighboring districts may 
be due to the effect, discussed above, about the incentives of non-mining districts in mining areas 
to gain access to the canon by attracting mining companies to their districts. They may therefore 
choose not to exploit the already scarce water resources by investing in water and instead prioritize 
investments in infrastructure (as indicated in the following assessment).  
A somewhat surprising result is the positive effect of the dependence of canon minero 
observed in the results. According to the discussion in the first part of the paper, we would expect 
the canon minero to have either a no-effect or a negative effect on the propensity to invest in water. 
The canon minero seems instead to have a positive impact on the propensity to invest in water. 
This result provides an even stronger indication that the negative effect on water access due to 
mining is caused by a direct influence of the mining industry over the investment behavior of local 
governments and not to the indirect effect of the canon minero.  
Not only does this result indicate that channels of influence exist between the mining 
industry and the local governments of hosting districts; it also provides a potential explanation to 
why the population of districts with mines within its boundaries tends to have a lower access to 
public water systems. 
 
Table 5 – Probit: The Impact of Mining on the Local Governments’ Propensity to Invest in Water 
and Sanitation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Mining district dummy (β0) -0.027* 
(0.036) 
-0.109*** 
(0.038) 
-0.036* 
(0.036) 
-0.113*** 
(0.036) 
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Mining province dummy (β1) -0.097*** 
(0.022) 
-0.061** 
(0.025) 
-0.126*** 
(0.022) 
-0.078*** 
(0.021) 
Dependence on canon (β2) 0.323*** 
(0.057) 
0.138** 
(0.068) 
  
Control variables     
Provincial capital -0.025* -0.004 0.032* 0.016 
Population -0.013* 0.019* 0.030* 0.029* 
Rural population 0.467*** 0.433*** 0.427*** 0.410*** 
Total budget 0.025** 0.022* -0.026* 0.010 
Local gov. employees -0.005 -0.039** -0.020* -0.042** 
Inequality 1.979*** 2.773*** 1.895*** 2.688*** 
Budget execution rate 0.235*** 0.244*** 0.216*** 0.263*** 
Water coverage 1993 0.020 0.132*** 0.039* 0.135*** 
Water coverage 2011 -0.025* -0.100*** -0.028* -0.099*** 
Poverty rate (2009) -0.166*** 0.009 -0.146** 0.021 
Department dummies  YES  YES 
_cons -1.978*** -2.442*** -1.607*** -2.388*** 
     
N 31702 31702 31702 31702 
 
 
4.2.2. Propensity to invest in infrastructure 
 
Finally, I evaluate the assumption that the local governments, under the influence of the mining 
industry and/or the indirect effects of the canon minero, may prioritize investments within 
infrastructure, an area which is stressed by the mining industry as being in need of expansion. As 
in the previous analysis, the impact of mining on the propensity to invest in infrastructure is 
estimated. In line with expectations, there seem to be a significantly positive effect of mining on 
the propensity to invest in infrastructure. After accounting for regional differences, the province 
dummy become positive and significant as well. In consequence, it seems as though the presence 
of mining affects the neighboring districts to invest in infrastructure as well. As mentioned above 
this may be due to the fact that districts in mining areas are trying to attract mining companies to 
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their districts to be able to gain access to the income from the canon minero. This could incentivize 
them to invest more in infrastructure and less in water and sanitation.  
Again, the effect of the dependence of the canon minero displays an unexpected result. 
When accounting for fixed effects, the effect of the canon is negative. The positive impact of the 
influence of mining to prioritize investments in infrastructure seems, therefore, not to be related to 
the indirect effect of the canon minero but rather to the direct effect of the presence of the mining 
industry in the districts.  
 
Table 6 – Probit: The Impact of Mining on the Local Governments’ Propensity to Invest in 
Infrastructure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Mining district dummy (β0) 0.141*** 
(0.029) 
0.132*** 
(0.032) 
0.147*** 
(0.029) 
0.127*** 
(0.031) 
Mining province dummy (β1) 0.010     
(0.018) 
0.128*** 
(0.022) 
0.022* 
(0.018) 
0.109*** 
(0.021) 
Dependence on canon (β2) 0.152*** 
(0.049) 
-0.177*** 
(0.059) 
  
Control variables     
provincial capital -0.005 -0.037** -0.031** -0.011 
population 0.131*** 0.145*** 0.115*** 0.155*** 
rural -0.327*** -0.376*** -0.313*** -0.394*** 
total budget -0.029** -0.089*** -0.005 -0.106*** 
local gov. Employees 0.016* 0.002 0.019* 0.005 
inequality -0.216* -0.442* -0.230* -0.528* 
execution rates 0.454*** -0.051 0.457*** -0.024 
poverty rate (2009) -0.320*** -0.349*** -0.323*** -0.347*** 
Department dummies  YES  YES 
_cons -1.709*** -0.242* -1.890*** -0.138 
     
N 38198 38198 38198 38198 
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In sum, the results of part two indicate that mining has a direct impact on the investment behavior 
of local governments. In consequence, mining districts have a lower propensity to invest in water 
and sanitation and a higher propensity to invest in infrastructure. The results also identified a 
potentially indirect effect on the neighboring districts within the same province which also seem 
to prioritize investments in infrastructure before water and sanitation.  
As stated above, this not only indicates that the mining industry seem to have a political 
influence over local governments, it also provides an explanation to the peculiar fact that mining 
districts in Peru, although generally richer, seem to provide a lower household level access to 
water. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The results of this paper indicate that mining has a negative impact on access to water on a district 
level in Peru. The effect is significant for districts in direct connection to mining. Districts 
belonging to a province with mining production, however, experience a positive effect of mining. 
The dependence on the canon minero is not statistically significant. To go beyond merely 
establishing the relation between mining and water access, this paper tries to disentangles the 
nature of the impact of mining on water access by turning to the entities responsible for the 
provision of water and sanitation services; the local governments. By assessing the effects of 
mining related to the structure of budgetary procedure, the participation of mining companies in 
local development and the impact of the canon minero, potential direct and indirect channels of 
influence were identified and analyzed. The direct effect of mining was identified as the 
participation of mining in local governments’ decision making process and the less direct effect of 
mining companies’ investments in local development through the Mining Program of Solidarity 
with the People and other Corporate Social Responsibility projects. These channels of influence 
are assumed to have a negative effect on the propensity of local governments to invest in water 
and sanitation due to the enforcement of the incentive scheme of the mining industry upon the 
decision making procedure of governments. Indirect effects of mining were identified in relation 
to the canon minero. Dependence on the canon was assumed to either have a no-effect on 
investments in water due to lack of capacity to execute the resources or a negative effect due to 
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the prioritization of simpler projects due to the budgetary procedure connected the these recourses. 
The canon was also assumed to indirectly impact investments behavior of neighboring districts in 
mining areas by providing local governments with incentives to attract mining companies to access 
the canon by investing in areas benefitting the industry.  
Results indicate that mining has an impact on local governments’ investment behavior. 
Mining districts have a lower propensity to invest in water and sanitation and a higher propensity 
to invest in infrastructure, in line with expectations. This effect also regards districts belonging to 
the same province as the mining districts. The dependence on canon minero is displaying 
unexpected results and seems to have a positive impact on the propensity to invest in water and a 
negative impact on the propensity to invest in infrastructure. The results contradicts the findings 
of Arellano-Yanguas (2010) who also looked at public investment data. Since he did not account 
for the presence of mining, the direct effects of mining was most likely absorbed by the canon 
minero. The result indicates that the most important effects of mining are the direct effects of the 
physical presence of the companies in the districts.  
In addition, my results indicate that there might exist an indirect effect on the neighboring 
districts in mining areas. The non-mining districts within provinces with mining production also 
experience an effect of mining on the propensity to invest in water and sanitation and 
infrastructure, similar to the mining districts. As argued above, this may be due to the incentive 
provided by the potential to obtain future revenue from the canon by trying to attract mining 
companies to their districts. It is possible that there are other effects at work here but it is a thesis 
worth exploring.  
In sum, the result shows that both local governments within districts directly affected by 
mining and those indirectly affected by mining by administrative and geographic proximity tend 
to be affected by mining when prioritizing public investments. This seem to occur through direct 
channels of influence, such as mining companies’ participatory budgeting and/or engagement in 
local development projects, rather than through the indirect effect of the canon minero. This effect 
may be a reason for the lower access to public water systems in mining districts, which is one of 
the reasons behind the social discontent of the population in mining areas. 
As for future research proposals I suggest that the quantitative research should make an effort 
to include the role of public institutions when assessing the impact of economic change, especially 
in contexts of weak political institutions. On the other hand, as evident from this study, it is also 
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essential for research on the impact of governmental policies to include the impact of economic 
actors present in the political sphere. Hence, I call for a more holistic approach when assessing 
social issues in relation to mining. On a more concrete note, I encourage researchers to use the 
public database on public investments in Peru. It will prove useful not only to understand the 
relation between private and public actors, but could also provide valuable information on the 
effects of the decentralization policies in Peru. It could therefore help us gain more knowledge 
about how to strengthen public institutions so that resources stemming from the exploitation of 
natural resources can reach out to the entire population and create development for all layer of 
society.   
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